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RECENT CASES.
ACCIDENT INSCRANCE-INJURY IN A FIcHT-SELF-DEFENSE.-The plain-
tiff was in his office when a man entered and without provocation began talking
to him abusively, finally, making demonstrations with his fists and rushing at
him as if to attack him. The plaintiff struck the first blow, and in the struggle
was knocked against an iron safe and sustained severe injuries. He held an
accident policy from the defendant company, which insured him against injuries
caused by "external, violent, and accidental means." 1Held: The injury was
"accidental" within the meaning of the policy, the plaintiff having acted in self-
defense, notwithstanding the fact that he struck the first blow. Travelers'
Insurance Co. v. Dupree, 82 So. 579 (Ala. ix9i).
Where the policy insures against "accidental" injuries, the insured cannot
recover for injuries resulting from a voluntary fight or one in which he was the
aggressor. Taliaferro v. Travelers' Protective Association, 80 Fed. 368 (1897);
Meister v. General Accident Corp., 179 Pac. 913 (Ore. i919); even though the
injury was not directly inflicted by his opponent, as where the insured, having
started a fist fight, slipped on the floor and fractured his leg. Hutton v. State
Accident Insurance Co., 267 III. 267 (1915).
But where the insured was not the aggressor, but acted in self-defense,
injuries sustained are "accidental." Phelan v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 38
Mo. App. 640 (189o); Allen v. Travelers' Protective Association, 143 N. W. 574
(Iowa 1913).
One of the questions in the principal case was whether the insured was the
aggressor. The answer can best be found in cases outside of the field of insur-
ance.
In assault and battery cases, civil or criminal, the fact that a man struck
the first blow does not necessarily make him the aggressor, nor deprive him of
his plea of self-defense, where the blow was struck to ward off an impending
blow from his opponent. Beavers v. Bowen, So S. W. ii65 (Ky. £9o4); Har-
rison v. State, 85 S. IV. Io58 (Tex. x9o5); Marker v. Hanratty, 97 A. 9o4 (Del.
1916). Thus where the plaintiff had raised and cocked his gun when the de-
fendant fired, the defendant was justified in using such force as was necessary to
protect himself. Moran v. Vicroy, 74 S. W. 244 (Ky. 1903).
A few cases have gone so far as to hold that even if the insured was clearly
the aggressor, the injury was "accidental," if it was an unusual and unexpected
result of the fight, as where the insured attempted to eject a man from a hotel,
having no reaion to anticipate more than a fist fight, and was shot by his oppo-
nent. Lovelace v. Association, 28 S. W. 877 (Mo. 1894); Erb v. Commercial
Mutual Accident Co., 232 Pa. 215 (19i1).
This case is undoubtedly sound, its only novel feature being the applica-
tion of the doctrine, that one need not wait until actually hit before striking in
self-defense, to the particular field of accident insurance law.
DAMAGES-WRONGFUL DisMiss.L--GRATUXTIEs.-An assistant in a hair-
dressing establishment, wrongfully dismissed, claimed that damages for breach
of his contract should include gratuities which he would have received from
(8i)
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customers. had he continued under the contract. 1ield: The gratuities should
be included, since this loss necessarily flowed from the breach, and was within
the contemplation of the parties. Manubens v. Lcon, 12o Law Times 279 (1918).
This case apparently comes well within the rule that damages tor breach
of contract should be such as arise naturally therefrom, and may reasonably be
supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was
entered into. Htadley v. Baxendale. 9 Excb. 341 (1854). But it is more doubt-
ful whether it conforms to the principle that damages claimed must be reasonably
certain, and that damages which are uncertain, contingent, andi speculative are
not recoverable. Rogers v. Bemus, 69 Pa. 432 (1871); Briggs v. N. Y. C. &
H. R. R. Co., 177 N. Y. 59 (19o3).
The cases involving loss of commissions present circumstances very similar
to the principal case, and the degree of uncertainty appears to be about the
same in both. It has been held that the loss sustained by a servant whose dis-
missal deprives him of the opportunity of earning commissions on new trans-
actions is too speculative and conjectural to be included in damages. Ex parte
Maclure, 5 Ch. App. 737 (1870); Raphaels Claim, 2 Ch. 309 (1916); Beck v.
West, 87 Ala. 213 (z888); Hair v. Barnes, 26 I11. App. 580 (1888). But some
courts hold that such commissions can be taken into account in damages. Spen-
cer Medicine Co. v. Hall, 78 Ark. 336 (19o).
The common practice by the courts of allowing damages to be shown
approximately would -eem to require no extension in order to include the prin-
cipal case. Gratuities to be expected in a steady trade like hair-dressing seem
to be more certain than the amount of fish likely to be caught within a definite
time, as was allowed to be reckoned in damages for an assault and battery upon
a fisherman who was thereby prevented for a time from earning his regular liv-
ing. Lund v. Tyler, 115 Iowa 236 (19oi). But the commission cases, decided
contrary to the principal case, present a considerable body of authority against it.
M ARRIAGE-PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF EXISTING MIARRIAGE-ESTOP-
PEL,-The appellant asserted her right as widow to letters of administration in
the estate of decedent under a marriage in 188i. Marriage licenses of appellant
and another man dated 19o5, and of present widow and decedent dated 1895
were proven. H1eld: That the presumption of the validity of the second mar-
riages was not overcome by sufficient evidence; and that every principle of decency
and morals, as well as of law, should combine to estop the appellant from assert-
ing her rights under her first marriage by setting up the invalidity of her second.
In Re Hilton's Estate, io6 Atl. 69 (Pa. 1919).
The presumption of the validity of existing marriages, which collaterally
involves a presumption of innocence from the crime of bigamy, places such a
burden of proof upon the party questioning it, that he must conclusively prove
his point, Best on Evidence, See. 346, even where this is only possible by the
proof of a negative, Greenleaf on Evidence, Sec. 35; for example that a divorce
had not taken place, Wile's Estate, 6 Pa. Super. 435 (I898); or that the first
husband was not dead at the time of the second marriage, McCausland's Estate,
213 Pa. x89 (19o6); Vreeland v. Vreeland, 79 Atl. 336 (N. J. 191n). In the prin-
cipal case the evidence was held not to be sufficiently weighty because the general
moral character of the appellant rendered her testimony of doubtful veracity;
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because the important witnesses were interested; and because evidence of dis-
continued divorce proceedings did not preclude the possibility that they had
bxeen discontinued for the reason that the first marriage had been found invalid.
The dictum finding an estoppel under the doctrine "ex turpe causa non
oritur actio" is questionable law. Similar dictum is found in Richardson's Es-
tate. 132 Pa. 292 (i89o), cited by the court, but the better rule is that in Sloan's
Estate, 50 Wash. 86 (t9o8). which held that the husband was not estopped from
defeating the right of his second wife's heirs to certain community property by
proving the invalidity of ti second marriage. In the principal case the right
to letters of administration arises solely out of the first marriage, from the prov.
ing of which the invalidity of the second follows as a consequence. It cannot
be said that the right here sought arises out of the invalidity of the second mar-
riage. Furthermore, principles of decency and morals are not in themselves
grounds for an estoppel. They constitute an important element in the pre-
sumption discussed above. but had this presumption been rebutted by conclusive
proof of the first marriage, as in Sloan's Case, supra, the court would probably
have held there was no estoppel.
MASTER ANCD SERVANT-'VOWMEW'S COMPENSATIO-RECOVERY FOR
AccIEr.D--DisE.s.-A workman employed in bagging bone manure contracted
blood poisoning and died. The point of infection was an abrasion on his leg.
It was not shown when or where the scratch was received, nor when the infection
occurred; but it was found as a fact that the infection was caused by the entry of
germs contained in the bone manure. IHeld: Death was caused by "personal
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment," within the
meaning of Sect. i (t) Workmen's Compensation Act, i9o6. Innes v. Kynoch,
121 L. T. 39 (igig).
The decision in this class of case depends on the interpretation of the words
of the Statute "injury by accident." Decisions construing this phrase show' a
progressive liberality. In t9o5 a radical departure from strict interpretation
allowed compensation for injury which took the form of disease, on the ground
that the entry of the germ was accidental. Brinton's Limited v. Turvey, 92
L. T. 578 (19oS). Unwilling to go so far, courts subsequently declared this case
anomalous, as decided on a special finding of accident by the trial judge. Eke v.
Hart-Dyke, 2 K. B. 677 (1to); Liondale Bleach Works v. Riker, 85 N. J. L.
426 (19r4).
Attempts to bring occupational and industrial diseases within the "injury
by accident" clause have as yet been rejected. Stetl v. Cammel, 2 K. B. 232
(igo5). Adamsv. Acme, 182 Mich. 157 (1914). It has, however, been generally
held that a disease, the result of an injury by accident, is compensable. Larke
v. Life Ins. Co. go Conn. 303 (1915). Plass v. Central New England Ry., 155
N. Y. S. 854 (1915). It has also been held that an accident which brings the
workman into contact with the source of infection is within the meaning of the
phrase. Alloa Coal Co. v. Drylie, 6 B. IV. C.C. 398 (1913). Monsonv. Battelle,
102 Kan. 2o8 (1918).
Many courts have held that the element of accident must be furnished
b.v an event answering to the popular use of the word. and that the invasion of;he bacillus is not such an event; with the additional objection that only an
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approximate date can be assigned the "accident." Broderick v. London County
Council, 2 K. B. 807 (19o8); Eke v. Hart-Dyke, 2 K. B. 677 (191o); Liondale
Bleach Works v. Riker, 85 N. J. L. 426 (1914).
The most liberal construction gives compensation for injury resulting
from the entrance of the bacillus, when the point of infection is an abrasion in-
curred in the course of employment, likening the invasion of the germ to a blow
or assault. Great Western Power Co. v. Pillsbury, 171 Cal. 69 (I915). Hiers v.
Hull, 164 N. Y. S. 767 (1917).
The principal case takes the extreme position that there is no necessity
for a definite date, and that the injury is compensable though the abrasion is
not incurred in the course of employment.
MASTER AND SERVANT-EIrFECT OF ORDERS-ASSUMPTION OF RIsK.m-
Plaintiff was employed by defendant to take care of his cows. He was injured
by one of the cows while removing a halter from her, under direction of the de-
fendant. Meld: Recovery is possible, even though the plaintiff knew at tile time
that the cow was vicious, if he acted with that degree of prudence which an ordi-
narily prudent man would exercise under the circumstances. Walters v. Sievers,
i81 Pac. 853 (Wash. 1919).
The court has here given the maximum significance to the effect of a mas-
ter's command in relieving the servant from voluntary assumption of risk.
According to a great line of cases the direct command of a master negatives
the idea of voluntary assumption of risk, Dallemand v. Saalfeldt, 175 Iil. 310
(1898); Atkins v. Madry, 93 S. E. 744 (N. C. 1917); and if injury result therefrom
knowledge by the servant that there was some danger in the act is not a bar to
recovery unless the danger was so obvious and imminent that an ordinarily
prudent man would have refused obedience under the circumstances. Vandalia
R. Co. v. Kendall, s19 N. E. 816 (Ind. x918); Roy v. Louisville Gas & Elee. Co.,
203 S. W. 855 (Ky. i918). However this distinction has been made,-a command
to negative the idea of assumption of risk must be specific as to time and manner,
and cannot be in the nature of a general command leaving details of performance
to the judgment of the servant. The Standard Cement Co. v. Minor, 54 Ind.
App. 3o (1913).
The legal grounds for recognizing the coercive effect of the master's com-
mand, even in the face of obvious danger, are the servant's primary duty of
obedience, and his right to rely on the master's superior knowledge of the danger
and fulfillment of the duty of due care towards him. Dickinson v. Mooneyham,
203 S. W. 840 (Ark. 1918); Porter v. Wilson, 62 Pa. Super. Ct. 339 (i916). Neces-
sity for quick action may also be a determining factor. Cherry v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., 93 S. E. 783 (N. C. 1917).
In cases where the risk in obeying is equally obvious to master and servant
it would often be illogical to find that the master was negligent in commanding
the act and that the servant was free from negligence in performing. In many
such cases the court has refused recovery on the ground of contributory negli-
gence, City of Greeley v. Foster, 32 Col. 292 (i9o4); or because the defendant
was not negligent, Skidmore v. Vest Virginia & P. R. R. Co., 41 W. Va. 293
(1895); or assumption of risk, used by the court to mean contributory negligence.
Lexington & E. Ry. v. Stacy, 189 S. W. 25 (Ky. 19x6). Most of the apparent
contradictions to the direct command rule are due to confusion of terms.
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But in cases where the facts are similar to those of the principal case there
is a decided tendency to submit the question to the jury as to the negligence of
plaintiff and defendant. Vandalia R. Co. v. Kendall, supra.; Roy v. Louisville
Gas & Elec. Co., su pra. The sanction thus put by law on the master's
command is not in keeping with the modern conception of the relation of master
and servant. The ideas of respect for authority, dependence on the master,
and fear of discharge are not living forces in our industrial world. Therefore
the decision in the principal case indicates a willingness to fall in line with the
trend of modern thought, away from the individualistic notions of the law of
master and servant, and toward the "absolute liability" idea as expressed in.
Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation Acts.
TRUSTS-CAPITAL AND TINCOME-PROCEEDS OF STOCV DIvxDEND.-Where
a stock dividend was declared by a company, whose stock was held in trust,
against surplus assets earned before the creation of the trust, the company sold
the stock and distributed the greater portion of the cash received. IHeld: Such
extraordinary 'cash dividends belonged to the corpus of the trust estate as capital,
and not to the life tenants as income. Hospital Trust Co. v. Peckham, 107
Atl. 209 (R. 1. i999).
This question has never been decided in Rhode Island, although many
similar cases have arisen in other jurisdictions. It has been held that cash
dividends, however large, are income, and stock dividends, however made, are
capital. Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. io (1868). This is known as the Massa-
chusetts rule, and is founded on convenience and simplicity, often resulting in
great hardship and injustice.
In Earp's Appeal, 28 Penna. 368 (1857) it was held that extraordinary
dividends should be apportioned between the life estate man and the remainder-
man in accordance with the amount thereof accumulated before and after the
creation of the trust. This rule prevails in nearly every state in the Union and
may well be called the American rule. It proceeds upon the theory that the
court in disposing of the dividends may properly inquire as to the time they were
earned or accumulated. If found 'to have accrued before the life estate arose
they are held to be principal, and, irrespective of the time declared, to belong to.
the corpus of the estate. But if the fund out of which the dividend is paid ac-
crued after the life estate arose, then it is held that the dividend is income and
belongs to the tenant for life. The ruling in this case has been steadily main-
tained without modification or change. Accord: In re Kernochan, 104 N. Y.
618 (1887); In re Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344 (i89i); Spooner v. Phillips et al.,
24 AtI. 524 (Conn. 1892).
:The English rule was first established in 1799 and holds that an extra-
ordinary cash, stock, or property dividend belongs to the corpus of the estate.
Brander v. Brander, 4 Vesey 8oo (1799). It has been held in recent cases that
extraordinary cash dividends may be decreed to belong to the life tenant. Bouch
v. Sproule, 57 L. T. R. 345 (1887); Sugden v. Alsbury, 63 L. T. R. 576 (189o);
Ellis v. Barfield, 64 L. T. R. 625 (I89i).
It is evident that the courts differ widely in laying down rules on the Eub-
ject. The rule in Minot's Case is the minority rule and prevails in Massachusetts
and Georgia. The English decisions are in a state of confusion. The Rhode
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Island Court in following the Pennsylvania rule in the principal case has accepted
a rule founded not on convenience and simplicity, but on satisfactory legal reason-
ing.
WILLS-CONDITIONS IN RESTRAINT OF IARRIAE.-Testatrix left money
in trust for her daughter, provided that (z) she should not marry X, and (2)
that she should marry one of her own social class. At the time the will was
drawn the daughter was engaged to X. She subsequently married him. tteld:
The daughter lost the legacy. The first condition was valid, and had not been
fulfilled. The second condition was void for uncerlainty, and the conditions
were not so interdependent that the invalidity of the sciond destroyed the first.
Turner v. Evans, io6 Atl. 617 (Md. igig).
Only conditions which totally or unreasonably restrain marriage are now
considered invalid: see note, 49 L. R. A. (N..S.) 6o5. Conditions in sills re-
straining marriage with particular individuals or classes have been uniformly
held to be valid. Jervois v. Duke, I Vere. 19 (i697);.Jenner v. Turner, L. R.
16 Ch. Div. 188 (188o); in re Seamon, 218 N. Y. 77 (x916). But the validity of
a condition requiring the legatee to break a binding promise has never before
been decided in any jurisdiction. In Graydon Vt. Graydon, 23 N. J. Eq. 229
(1872) the point was raised, but there the legatee was a minor son, and his promise
was voidable. It was held in the principal case that the binding promise by the
legatee made no difference in the validity of the condition. This was logical
from the point of view of the testatrix, whose reasons against X would be as
urgent after the engagement as before; and the court was trying to carry out the
will of the testatrix.
The question of the validity of the second condition has rarely been decided,
and is one of first impression in Maryland. In Greene v. Kirkwood, I I. R. 130
(1895) a condition not to marry a "man of a lower social plane" was held to be
valid. There the court undertook to set up a standard whereby the jury could
find a verdict. But in Keilly v. Monck, 3 Ridg. P. C. 205 (1795) a condition
not to marry a man "not seised in fee, or perpetual freehold of an cstate of an
annual value of £5oo above incumbrances" was held to be too general and vague.
And in Watts v. Griffin, 137 N. C. 572 (19o5) a condition not to marry "common
women" was held invdlid for vagueness. So the principal case seems to come
under the majority rule.
GIFTS-PAROL GIFTs-GooD COXSIDERATIoN.-Ileld: A parol gift of land
by a man to the wife of his living son and the mother of an infant child is sup-
ported by good or meritorious consideration. Berry v. Berry, 99 S. E. 79 (W1. Va.
1919).
It is well settled that relationship by consanguinity will constitute meri-
torious consideration to support a gift to a son, Hardman v. Roberts, I Vern.
132 (Eng. 1682); Hadden v. Thompson, 118 Ga. 207 (i9o3); or to a daughter,
Jefferys v. Jefferys, Craig & Phillips 139 (Eng. 1841); but not to an illegitimate
child, Fursaker v. Robinson, Finch Pre. in Cha. 475 (Eng. 1717); nor a nephew,
Buford v. McKee, 31 Ky. 107 (1833); nor a niece, Mark v. Clark, II B.. Mon.
44 (Ky. 185o); Contra Porter v. Allen, 54 Ga. 623 (1875) in which case the
court fails to state any authority for its decision.
It is also well settled that relationship by marriage constitutes such meri-
torious consideration as will support a gift. Ashburne's Principles of Equity,
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527; but there is a conflict as to the extent to which this doctrine will be carried.
Thus a son-in-law, whose wife and child were dead, has been held to come within
the rule. Bell v. Scammon, z5 N. H. 381 (1844). Accord Gale v. Coburn, il
Pick 397 (Mass. 1836) in which case the wife was dead but there were living chil-
dren; contra Corwin v. Corwin, 6 N. Y. 342 (1852) wherein the wife and children
of the grantee were living at the time grant was made. The court in the last
case did not cite any authority for its decision. A daughter-in-law has also been
held to come within the rule. Berry v. Berry supra. Contra Jackson v. Cald
well, i Cowen 622 (N. Y. 1824) in which case the husband was dead but there
was a living child. The court based its decision on the fact that there was n1
relation by blood between the grantor and grantee, entirely disregarding the
question of relationship by marriage.
The cases which are in accord with the principal case base their decisions
that gifts to sons-in-law and daughters-in-law who have living children are sup-
ported by meritorious consideration, on the ground that this is merely an indirect
method of providing for the grandchildren who are related to the grantor by
consanguinity.
WORKMEN'S. COMPENSATION-PREsUMPTION OF SUICIDE-BuRDEN or
PRooF.-A man employed to remove wood-ashes died of alkali poisoning. A
large quantity of ashes, part of which had combined with water and formed
lye, was found in his stomach. Ield: The burden of proving a claim for compen-
sation is on those seeking the award. The inference that the ashes were
swallowed with suicidal intent is as reasonable as the inference that they were
in the system as a result of the employment. The inferences being equal,
the claim must fail. Chaudier v. Sterns & Culver Lumber Company, 173 N. IV.
198 (Mich. 1919).
The general rule in compensation cases is that the burden of proof in the
first instance is on the person seeking the award. Where a death occurs and there
is no positive evidence as to whether it was accidental or suicidal, there is a pre-
sumption against suicide. Fisher v. Life Association, 188 Pa. t (1898); Clemens
v. Royal Neighbors, etc., 103 N. W. 402 (N. D. 19oS). Therefore the defendant
must put the fact of suicide in issue, if he intends to rely on it in his defense and
when he does so, the burden of proving that fact is on him. According to the
Michigan cases, the actual burden of proof shifts under such circumstances.
Grant v. Railway, i B. W. C. C. 17 (England 1907); Papinaw v. Graitd Trunk,
189 Mich. 441 (xiq5); Wishcaless v. Hammond, etc., 201 Mich. 192 (iq98).
Unless the defendant proves that the death was due to suicide, the presumption
against suicide will prevail and the inferences would not be equal as stated in the
principal case, with the result that the claimant will recover if he makes out a
prima facie case.
The Michigan Workmen's Compensation Act is silent as to the burden
of proof in suicide cases. Michigan Laws of 1912, page 23, part II, section 2.
The Pennsylvania Act specifically provides that when the employer alleges that
the death was due to suicide, "the burden of proof of such fact shall be upon the
employer." Laws of Pennsylvania, 1915, page 738, article ill, section 301.
For cases under the Pennsylvania Act sea Flucker v. Steel Co., XV. C.
Supplement to Department Reports of Pa., volume 3, page 2989 (1917); Keyes v.
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N. Y., Ont., & W. Ry., W. C. Supplement to Dept. Reports of PZ., volume 3,
page 2698 (917). The Keyes case was appealed to the Common Pleas Court of
Lackawanna County which reversed the Board on the ground that the defense
of suicide did not release the claimant from the burden of proving that the death
was due to the employment, even though the defendant failed to establish the
fact of suicide. Keyes v. Ry., I Mackey, Court Decisions under the W. C. L
of Pa., page 195 (1917). This opinion has been appealed to the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, but no decision on it has been handed down.
